Market Size, Division of Labor, and Firm Productivity by Chaney, Thomas & Ossa, Ralph
Journal of International Economics 90 (2013) 177–180
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of International Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate / j i eMarket size, division of labor, and ﬁrm productivity☆
Thomas Chaney a, Ralph Ossa b,⁎
a University of Chicago, Department of Economics, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA
b University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, USA☆ We are grateful to Pol Antras, Holger Breinlich, Aleja
Gianmarco Ottaviano, Henry Overman, Stephen Reddin
thank the editor, Robert W. Staiger, and two anonymou
comments. All remaining errors are ours. This work e
Ossa's Ph.D. dissertation originally entitled “Trade Lib
Firm Productivity.”
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: thomas.chaney@gmail.com (T. Cha
ralph.ossa@chicagobooth.edu (R. Ossa).
0022-1996/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2012.11.003a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 12 August 2011
Received in revised form 16 July 2012
Accepted 4 November 2012
Available online 12 November 2012
JEL classiﬁcation:
F10
F12
L22
L25
Keywords:
Market size
Division of labor
Firm productivity
Technology transferWe generalize Krugman's (1979) ‘new trade’ model by allowing for an explicit production chain in which a
range of tasks is performed sequentially by a number of specialized teams. We demonstrate that an increase
in market size induces a deeper division of labor among these teams which leads to an increase in ﬁrm pro-
ductivity. The paper can be thought of as a formalization of Smith's (1776) famous theorem that the division
of labor is limited by the extent of the market. It also sheds light on how market size differences can limit the
scope for international technology transfers.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In this paper, we develop a simple general equilibrium model in
which an increase in market size leads to an increase in the division of
labor which brings about an increase in ﬁrm productivity. In particular,
we generalize Krugman's (1979) seminal ‘new trade’model by opening
the black box of the production function and allowing for an explicit
production chain in which a range of tasks is performed sequentially
by a number of specialized production teams. An increase in market
size induces a deeper division of labor among these teams which
leads to an increase in ﬁrm productivity. Underlying this is a trade-off
between the ﬁxed costs associated with establishing a team and the
marginal costs associated with the degree of specialization of the team
which ﬁrms solve differently depending on the size of the market.
At the broadest level, the paper can be thought of as a formaliza-
tion of Smith's (1776) famous theorem that the division of labor isndro Cunat, Elhanan Helpman,
g, and Tony Venables. We also
s referees, for their thoughtful
xtends the second chapter of
eralization, Outsourcing, and
ney),
rights reserved.limited by the extent of the market in an environment in which the
division of labor takes the same form as in his pin factory.1 By embed-
ding the pin factory into a framework of monopolistic competition, it
overcomes the dilemma emphasized by Stigler (1951: 185) that
“either the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market,
and characteristically, industries are monopolized; or industries are
characteristically competitive, and the theorem is false or of little sig-
niﬁcance.” An increase in market size leads to both a deeper division
of labor within ﬁrms as well as the entry of new ﬁrms.
While our theory is not explicit about the nature of the increase in
market size, the usual interpretation of the Krugman (1979) model
suggests trade liberalization as a natural example. Recently, many
empirical studies have focused on the productivity effects of trade
liberalization (e.g. Pavcnik, 2002; Treﬂer, 2004). Their results suggest
that there are important trade-induced improvements in industry
productivity either through gains in average ﬁrm productivity (‘ﬁrm
productivity effect’) or through the reallocation of market share
from less to more productive ﬁrms (‘reallocation effect’). While our
theory cannot speak to the reallocation effect, it can be thought of
as a micro-foundation of the ﬁrm productivity effect.21 Recall that in Smith's (1776: 7) pin factory “one man draws out the wire, another
straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a ﬁfth grinds it at the top for receiving the
head (…)”.
2 Well-known formal treatments of the reallocation effect include Melitz (2003) and
Bernard et al. (2003).
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of the ﬁrm productivity effect. Previous work has mainly emphasized
ﬁxed costs (e.g. Krugman, 1979), learning by exporting (e.g. Clerides et
al., 1998), competition-induced innovation (e.g. Aghion et al., 2005), or
a horizontal focusing on core competencies by multi-product ﬁrms
(e.g. Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011). Only McLaren
(2000) also studies the productivity gains of a trade-induced vertical
restructuring of production. Both the source of the productivity gains
as well as the link between trade liberalization and the vertical
restructuring of production are very different in his model, however.
An additional implication of our model is that seemingly superior
technologies developed in larger markets, characterized by lower
ﬁxed costs of establishing teams and a ﬁner division of labor across
teams,may not be appropriate for smallermarkets. Firms in developing
countries may therefore not have an incentive to adopt technologies
from developed countries even if they are freely available to them.
This observation offers a novel explanation for the localized character
of technology which is usually rationalized by arguing that important
components of technology are tacit in nature (e.g. Keller, 2004: 753).
It essentially elaborates on the remark of Stigler (1951: 193) that Amer-
ican productionmethodswill often be too specialized to be an appropri-
ate model for industrialization in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: we lay out the
basic model, solve for the optimal organization of production, charac-
terize the general equilibrium, analyze the effects of an increase in
market size, consider the scope for international technology transfers,
and offer some concluding remarks.
2. Basic setup
There are L consumerswhoare endowedwith oneunit of labor each.
They have access to n ﬁnal goods over which they have ‘love of
variety’-preferences
U ¼
Xn
i¼1
u xið Þ ð1Þ
where u(xi) is the utility derived from consuming x units of ﬁnal good i
which is continuous and differentiable and satisﬁes u′(xi)>0 and u
″(xi)b0. Consumers maximize this utility subject to their budget con-
straints 1=∑ i=1n pixi, where pi is the price paid for good i and the
wage rate is normalized to 1.
As can be seen from the ﬁrst order conditions of the consumers’
maximization problems, the resulting demands have elasticity
ε xið Þ ¼− u′ xið Þxiu″ xið Þ. Following Krugman (1979), we assume that ε′(xi)b0
which is equivalent to assuming that the demand curves are less convex
than in the constant elasticity case (linear demand curves would be an
example). This assumption ensures that an increase inmarket size leads
to an increase in ﬁrm output which is necessary for market size to affect
the division of labor within ﬁrms. We also assume that ε 0ð Þ > 1þ 1γ and
that there exists an x > 0 such that ε xð Þ ¼ 1þ 1γ, where γ is a cost
parameter to be deﬁned below.3 These parameter restrictions guaran-
tee the existence and uniqueness of a monopolistically competitive
equilibrium.
The production of each ﬁnal good requires the sequential perfor-
mance of a number of tasks. Early tasks are concerned with obtaining
raw materials which are then reﬁned successively in later production
stages. The set of these tasks is represented by a segment of length
normalized to 2 which we call the production chain. To produce the
ﬁnal good, all tasks ω∈ [0,2] have to be performed sequentially. If3 A polynomial of degree higher than 2 for the function u(x) would satisfy this con-
dition, as would any sum of more than one power function of x. For instance, the qua-
dratic function u(x)=ax−x2/2 with x∈[0,a/2] yields a linear demand system and the
following simple expression for the demand elasticity, ε(x)=a/x−1, which satisﬁes
ε′(x)b0, ε(0)>1+1/γ, and x ¼ a2þ1=γ such that ε xð Þ ¼ 1þ 1γ.only tasks ω∈ [0,ω1], 0bω1b2, are performed, a preliminary good ω1
is obtained. This preliminary good ω1 can then be transformed into a
more downstream preliminary good ω2, 0bω1bω2b2, by performing
the additional tasks ω∈[ω1,ω2] and so on. One unit of each task is re-
quired to produce one unit of the ﬁnal good. Similarly, one unit of the
relevant subset of tasks is required to produce one unit of a preliminary
good.4
All production tasks associated with a given ﬁnal good are per-
formed by production teams within a single ﬁrm. Before being able to
perform any tasks, a team needs to acquire a core competency
c∈ [0,2] in the production chain which requires f units of labor. To per-
form one unit of each task in the range [ω1,ω2], the team then further
needs
l ω1;ω2ð Þ ¼
1
2
∫ω2ω1 c−ω
γdω
 ð2Þ
units of labor where γ>0 so that it gets worse at performing a given
task the further away that task is from its core competency. Teams are
symmetric in the sense that the parameters f and γ are the same across
teams. The ﬁrm can choose how many teams are established, which
core competencies they acquire, and which production tasks they
perform.
3. Optimal organization of production
Eq. (2) implies that the cost of producing one unit of output is min-
imized if each task is performed by only one team, the teams’ core com-
petencies are uniformly distributed along the production chain, and
each team performs a symmetric range of tasks around its core compe-
tency. Theminimum total cost of producing y units of output condition-
al on a given number of teams t can therefore be written as
TC ¼ t f þ y∫1t0ω
γdω
 
ð3Þ
since each team performs 2t tasks of which half are to the right and half
are to the left of its core competency.
The optimal number of teams solves a trade-off between ﬁxed and
marginal costs. This trade-off can be seen most clearly by rewriting
Eq. (3) as TC ¼ tf þ yt−γγþ1. On the one hand, more teams imply higher
ﬁxed costs since more core competencies need to be acquired. On
the other hand, more teams imply lower marginal costs since each
team performs a narrower range of tasks around its core competency.
Minimizing this expression with respect to t yields
t ¼ γ
γ þ 1
y
f
  1
γþ1 ð4Þ
Hence, the optimal number of teams is increasing in output. Intu-
itively, higher output makes marginal costs more important relative
to ﬁxed costs so that it is optimal to set up a larger number of more
highly specialized teams. Notice that the range of tasks performed
by each team is inversely proportional to the number of teams since
the production chain is of a given length and production tasks are
equally divided among teams.
As is easy to verify, Eqs. (3) and (4) imply that the average cost is
given by
AC ¼ γ þ 1
γ
f
y
  γ
γþ1
ð5Þ
Notice that the average cost is decreasing in output so that the pro-
duction technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. Underlying this4 A similar representation of the production process has been used by Dixit and
Grossman (1982).
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the average cost as AC ¼ tfy þ t∫
1
t
0ω
γdω using Eq. (3). First, the average
cost falls because the ﬁxed costs get spread over more units of output.
Second, the average cost falls because the number of teams is increased
to rebalance ﬁxed and marginal costs. Only the former effect is present
in Krugman (1979).5 The second effect magniﬁes the ﬁrst effect since
the number of teams is chosen to minimize costs.
While the details of Eqs. (3), (4), and (5) clearly depend on func-
tional form assumptions, they capture what seems to be a general
point: if production tasks are divided among specialized teams who
need to incur a ﬁxed cost to acquire a core competency and get
worse at performing a task the further away it is from their core com-
petency, the optimal number of teams is increasing in output since
the increase in output makes marginal costs more important relative
to ﬁxed costs. We therefore state this result as Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. The optimal number of teams is increasing in ﬁrm
output.
Proof. Follows immediately from Eq. (4). ■
4. General equilibrium
Firms interact in a monopolistically competitive fashion in the
sense that they maximize proﬁts taking the marginal utility of income
as given and enter until all proﬁts are driven down to zero. Free entry
implies that prices are equal to average costs and proﬁt maximization
implies that ﬁrms charge a proportional mark-up μ xð Þ ¼ ε xð Þε xð Þ−1 over
marginal costs. The equilibrium is characterized by the following
two conditions,
p ¼ γ þ 1
γ
f
y
  γ
γþ1
ð6Þ
p ¼ μ y=Lð Þ
γ þ 1
γ þ 1
γ
f
y
  γ
γþ1
ð7Þ
The ﬁrst condition follows immediately from Eq. (5). The second
condition combines the goods market clearing condition y=Lx with
the fact that marginal costs are given by MC ¼ 1γþ1 γ þ 1γ
f
y
  γ
γþ1
which
is obtained by straightforward manipulation of Eq. (5).6 The relation-
ships (6) and (7) are two equations in the two unknowns p and y
which we refer to as the FE (free entry) curve and the PM (proﬁt max-
imization) curve in the following. The FE curve is downward-sloping.
The PM curve is made up of two multiplicative terms. The ﬁrst term,
μ y=Lð Þ
γþ1 , is smaller than 1 at zero because ε 0ð Þ > 1þ 1γ, increasing in y be-
cause ε′(x)b0, and crosses 1 at some ﬁnite x because ε xð Þ ¼ 1þ 1γ. The
second term is the same term as the FE curve. Therefore, the PM curve
intersects the FE curve only once from below, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
so that p and y are uniquely pinned down.7 Given y, the equilibrium
t can then be determined from Eq. (4).
Notice that Eqs. (6) and (7) imply that mark-ups are constant in
equilibrium even though preferences are not of the constant elasticity
form. This is due to the fact that changes in the optimal division of
labor ensure that marginal costs and average costs fall proportionate-
ly in ﬁrm output so that mark-ups have to be constant for zero proﬁts
to prevail. This exact proportionality of marginal costs and average
costs depends on special functional form assumptions and should
not be taken literally. However, it may prove useful as a modeling
tool in other applications which seek to allow for a relatively general5 Indeed, the model would reduce to Krugman (1979) if the number of teams were
not a choice variable.
6 All subscripts have been dropped to reﬂect the symmetry of the equilibrium.
7 Notice that the PM curve does not have to be downward sloping.demand system without losing the tractability of constant elasticity
preferences.5. Increase in market size
We ﬁrst analyze an increase in market size which is captured by an
increase in the number of consumers L. As can be seen fromEqs. (6) and
(7), an increase in market size leaves the FE curve unchanged but leads
to a downward shift of the PMcurve. Intuitively, an increase in the num-
ber of consumers implies that each consumer gets less of a given quan-
tity of output which increases demand elasticities and reduces mark-
ups, other things equal. As illustrated in Fig. 2, this downward shift of
the PM curve implies that ﬁrms charge less and produce more which
is associated with an increase in the number of teams per ﬁrm as indi-
cated by Eq. (4). Intuitively, the larger market allows ﬁrms to sell
more whichmakes them establish a larger number of more highly spe-
cialized production teams.
Since average costs are simply the inverse of ﬁrm output per
worker, the fall in average costs associated with the increase in ﬁrm
output also represents an increase in ﬁrm productivity. Recall that av-
erage costs fall because the ﬁxed costs get spread over more units of
output and the number of teams is increased to rebalance ﬁxed and
marginal costs. Hence, while the model continues to feature the orig-
inal Krugman (1979) ﬁrm productivity effect, it also features a new
ﬁrm productivity effect which operates through an increase in the di-
vision of labor. The latter effect magniﬁes the former effect since the
degree of the division of labor is chosen optimally by ﬁrms.
Hence, an increase in market size indeed leads to an increase in
the division of labor which is associated with an increase in ﬁrm pro-
ductivity. It must be emphasized, however, that this result depends
on the fact that ﬁrm output is increasing in market size which, in
turn, depends on the assumption that the demand curves are less
convex than in the constant elasticity case. If utility was instead ofy
FE
y      y’
Fig. 2. Increase in market size.
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ﬁrms would simply increase proportionately with market size so
that individual ﬁrm output would remain unchanged. With this cave-
at in mind, we state this result as Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. An increase in market size leads to an increase in the di-
vision of labor which is associated with an increase in ﬁrm productivity.
Proof. Follows immediately from Fig. 2 and Eq. (4). ■
6. Technology transfer
We now consider the scope for technology transfers from a North-
ern country to a Southern country, where ﬁrms in the Northern coun-
try operate seemingly superior technologies. To analyze technology
transfers, we must ﬁrst deﬁne what a technology is. In the context
of this model, a technology has two key components. The ﬁrst corre-
sponds to the efﬁciency with which a ﬁrm is able to train specialized
production teams around a core competency and is captured by the
ﬁxed cost f.8 The second corresponds to the degree of division of
labor within a ﬁrm and is captured by the number of specialized pro-
duction teams t.
So far, we have treated only the ﬁxed cost f as a parameter and
allowed ﬁrms to optimally choose their organization t. This endoge-
nous choice was meant to capture a long-run adjustment during
which incumbents either reorganize or lose out to better organized
entrants. It is plausible, however, that both the ﬁxed cost f and the or-
ganization t have to be jointly transferred in the case of international
technology transfers. This is because the organization of production
solves a complex logistical problem so that a Southern ﬁrm is unlikely
to be able to rearrange the production chain of a Northern ﬁrm to ap-
propriately reﬂect local constraints.
Given the premise that technology transfers entail both f and t, it is
now easy to see that a Southern ﬁrm might be unwilling to adopt a
seemingly superior Northern technology. In particular, suppose that
the North has a larger market (LN>LS) and lower ﬁxed costs (fNb fS)
so that the division of labor is ﬁner there (tN> tS). If a Southern ﬁrm
then adopts the Northern technology, its proﬁtability increases on
the one hand due to the lower ﬁxed cost but decreases on the other
hand as a result of the suboptimally large number of teams. The for-
mer effect dominates the latter one only if the market size differences
underlying the differences in the optimal organization of production
are sufﬁciently small.
As a result, international technology transfers may not occur even
though Northern ﬁrms are unambiguously more productive and
make their technology freely available to Southern ﬁrms. We believe
that this offers a novel perspective on the notion of appropriate tech-
nology (e.g. Basu and Weil, 1998) and a novel explanation for the lo-
calized character of technology which is usually rationalized by
arguing that important components of technology are tacit in nature
(e.g. Keller, 2004: 753). We state our reasoning more rigorously as
Proposition 3:
Proposition 3. For any difference in market size between a larger
North and a smaller South (LN>LS), there exists Δ>0 such that no
Southern ﬁrm would want to adopt a Northern technology character-
ized by the Northern division of labor tN unless it offers them a reduc-
tion in their ﬁxed cost at least as large as Δ.8 Of course, the efﬁciency with which a ﬁrm is able to train specialized production
teams around a core competency also depends on the parameter γ. However, our point
can be made most clearly with reference to the parameter f so that we focus on it in the
following.Proof. Proposition 2 and Eq. (4) imply that tN> tS. From Eq. (3) and
the optimal choice of t given f, it follows directly that a Southern
ﬁrm's maximum proﬁts, πS, are decreasing in f and decreasing with
departures away from the optimal tS: πS satisﬁes πS(fS,tS)>πS(fS,tN),
∂πS
∂f b0,
∂πS
∂t f S; tSð Þ ¼ 0, and ∂
2πS
∂t2 b0. Therefore there exists a Δ>0 such that
πS(fS,tS)=πS(fS−Δ, tN). For any reduction in the ﬁxed cost smaller
than Δ, i.e. fS−Δb fNb fS, we have πS(fS,tS)>πS(fN,tN), and no Southern
ﬁrm would adopt the Northern technology (fN,tN) despite its strictly
lower ﬁxed cost. ■
7. Conclusion
“As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the divi-
sion of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited
by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the
market.” In this paper, we have demonstrated that this famous theo-
rem of Smith (1776: 16) can be rationalized by embedding a produc-
tion chain of the sort found in his pin factory into Krugman's (1979)
seminal ‘new trade’ environment. In a nutshell, we ﬁrst established
that the division of labor is limited by the extent of ﬁrm output and
then demonstrated that ﬁrm output is increasing in the extent of
the market. We also showed that in such an environment, seemingly
superior technologies developed in large markets may not be appro-
priate for smaller markets thus limiting the scope for international
technology transfers.
References
Aghion, P., Burgess, R., Redding, S., Zilibotti, F., 2005. Entry liberalization and inequality
in industrial performance. Journal of the European Economic Association 3, 291–302.
Basu, S., Weil, D., 1998. Appropriate technology and growth. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113 (4), 1025–1054.
Bernard, A., Eaton, J., Jensen, J., Kortum, S., 2003. Plants and productivity in international
trade. The American Economic Review 93, 1268–1290.
Bernard, A., Redding, S., Schott, P., 2011. Multi-product ﬁrms and trade liberalization.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (3), 1271–1318.
Clerides, S.K., Lach, S., Tybout, J.R., 1998. Is learning by exporting important? Micro-
dynamic evidence from Columbia, Mexico, and Morocco. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 113, 903–947.
Dixit, A., Grossman, G.M., 1982. Trade and protection with multi-stage production. The
Review of Economic Studies 49, 583–594.
Eckel, K., Neary, J.P., 2010. Multi-product ﬁrms and ﬂexible manufacturing in the global
economy. The Review of Economic Studies 77, 188–217.
Keller, W., 2004. International technology diffusion. Journal of Economic Literature 42,
752–782.
Krugman, P., 1979. Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international
trade. Journal of International Economics 9, 469–479.
Krugman, P., 1980. Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade.
The American Economic Review 70 (5), 950–959.
McLaren, J., 2000. Globalization and vertical structure. The American Economic Review
90, 1239–1254.
Melitz, M., 2003. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity. Econometrica 71, 1695–1725.
Pavcnik, N., 2002. Trade liberalization, exit, and productivity improvements: evidence
from Chilean plants. The Review of Economic Studies 69, 245–276.
Smith, A., 1776. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, vol. 1.
Strahan and Cadell, London, UK.
Stigler, George J., 1951. The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.
Journal of Political Economy 59, 185–193.
Treﬂer, D., 2004. The long and short of the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement. The
American Economic Review 94, 870–895.
